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No. 6931

Supplemental Brief of Appellants
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
In response to a request received from the Clerk of the
above entitled Court, Appellants submit herewith a Supple-
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mental Brief in connection with the cases set forth above, on
the following question:
"Does the inclusion of premium payments in the
base for assessment and taxation of mines violate the
constitutional requirements as to uniformity of assessment and taxation, as set forth in Sections 2, 3, and 4, of
Article XIII of the Constitution of Utah?"
The question being the same for each case, and both cases
having heretofore been combined for argument, this brief is
submitted jointly, and in typewritten form. Printed briefs will
be substituted as soon as they come from the press.
As we understand the question submitted, the Court desires to receive further assistance from counsel for the respective parties as to whether a construction of Sections 80-5-56 and
80-5-57, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, so as to include "premium
payments" as a part of the gross proceeds realized by the respective mining companies, would violate the provisions of
Sections 2, 3, and 4, Article XIII, of the Constitution of Utah.
Sections 2 and 3 of Article XIII relate to the uniformity of assessment of all tangible property of the State, while Section 4
provides specifically how metalliferous mines or mining claims
shall be assessed. The question of whether under the latter section the Legislature might provide for the assessment of metalliferous mines or mining claims on a basis which would result in
a lack of uniformity need not here be considered, since, as we
view the matter, the inclusion of "permium payments" as a part
of the gross proceeds realized by the respective mining com-
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panics from their ores produced in the calendar year in question
not only results in uniformity as to determining "net proceeds",
but that the failure to so include such payments would result
in discrimination as to the several mining companies when "net
proceeds" are determined.
Counsel for United States Smelting, Refining and Mining
Company, in their Answering Brief in case No. 6931, heretofore
filed posed a similar question to the one submitted by the Court
and in that brief attempted to show that the inclusion of "premium payments" in the gross proceeds of the several mining
companies would violate "the Constitutional and Statutory Requirements as to Uniformity of Assessment and Taxatinon."
(Respondent's Brief, page 21 et seq.). We will, therefore,
proceed to answer the argument therein set forth before setting
forth our affirmative argument as indicated.
ARGUMENT
1. Respondent first states positively that "A mine would
have a greater value in 1944 if it produced no ores in 1941 than
it would have had had it produced ores in 1941." This may or
may not be true. But it would not have a greater value in 1944
solely because it had no ore production in 1941. Counsel seem
to think that quotas were fixed on the basis of 1941 production
of ores, solely, but such an assumption is fallacious. Both of
the mining companies here concerned had ore production in
1941, but were assigned zero quotas with respect to at least
some of the metals involved. The stipulation of facts will reveal other companies similarly situated. In every instance, we
are told, the quotas were determined on a basis best calculated
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to increase production of ores and compensate the mining companies for such ore production, on a reasonable basis - to offset
their increased costs of production, to permit them a reasonable
profit on the extraction of sub-marginal ores, and otherwise
compensate the mines for their greater ore production to assist
the war effort. Regardless of the ore production of a mine in
1941, its quota was determined by the Committee after negotiating with the mine officials with the end in view to allow each
mine a sufficient sum for its ore produced as to encourage
greater and greater production, without, at the same time, allowing such mine to take advantage of a greater demand for such
critical materials to the end that it would profit unjustly from
the war effort.
2. While it is true that "two mines producing exactly the

same quantity of copper, lead or zinc in 1944 would have
different values, depending upon the quotas assigned to them,"
it is also true that such mines would have different values
even though their quotas were exactly the same. Mine "A" in
order to have the same value as Mine "B" would have to have
not only the same production of ore and the same quota
assigned by Metals Reserve Company, but would also have to
have the same identical costs of production, the same smelting
contract with the smelter; and if Mine "B" was a custom
shipper, Mine "A" would likewise have to be a custom smelter.
In other words, ALL of the factors involved in arriving at
"net proceeds" would have to be identically the same with
respect to Mines "A" and 'B'" in order for them to have the
same value. This matter will be discussed more fully hereinafter.
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3. Counsel next argue that "the more it costs to produce
ore from a mine the more valuable the mine would be." But
again they fail to take into consideration that under the
provisions of Section 80-5-57, Utah Code Annotated, 1943,
"net annual proceeds" are calculated by deducting from gross
receipts the various costs of production set forth in that section.
Among those deductions are: ( 1) "Amount of money actually
expended during the year for labor, tools, appliances and
supplies used in the mining operations, including the labor of
the lessee and his employees;" (2) "The actual and necessary
office and clerical expenses and the salaries of employees, other
than corporate officers, within the state;" ( 3) "The actual cost
of the installation, construction, maintenance and repair of
machinery and improvements made during the year in and
about the workings of the mine for use in extracting the ores;"
( 4) "The actual cost of reduction works, and improvements
thereof, constructed during the year and operated in connection
with the mine;" ( 5) "The actual cost of the transportation of
the ore from the mine to the market or reduction works;" and
many other items.
One of the pnmary purposes m granting and making
premium payments to the mining companies (after ceiling
prices on the various ores had been fixed) was to compensate
the several companies for their increased costs of production,
including increased labor costs, increased costs of materials,
etc. Yet Respondents would take the position that they are
entitled to deduct such costs of production, and all of such
costs, without including as a part of gross receipts such premium
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payments as were received, and without which payments there
would have been no production of ore for the reason that the
0. P. A. ceiling price would have been insufficient to take care
of the production costs.
We call attention at this point to what has occurred since
the ceiling prices have been removed on the ores produced
by Respondents and others. The price of copper has increased
above that received during the War both from the smelter
and from Metals Reserve Company, it being now 19lfz cents
per pound. Likewise with Lead which is now quoted at 11.65
cents and zinc which is quoted at 10.5 cents per pound. We do
not know whether the cost of production to the several mining
companies has increased since ceilings have been removed,
but certainly no contention will be made that the gross proceeds
now being received from ore production is not the total amount
received from all sources on account of such ores produced.
Now, then can Respondents contend that when a lesser amount
was actually received for the same production in the forepart
of the year 1946, only part of such receipts are "gross proceeds."
The foregoing facts are within the common knowledge of
everyone and are called to the court's attention merely for
the purpose of illustrating the mconsistency of the position
taken by the mining companies in the several cases pending in
the courts.
Having disposed of counsel's arguments contained
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their brief heretofore filed in Case No. 6931, we proceed to
a discussion of the Main Issues:

9

A Construction of the Statutes of Utah so as to Require
the Inclusion of "Premium Payments" as a part of the
"Gross Proceeds" realized from Ores produced would
not violate the provisions of Sections 2, 3, and 4, Article
XIII of the Constitution of the State of Utah.
At the outset, it must be remembered that while Sections
2 and 3 of Article XIII of the State Constitution require uniformity of assessment of all tangible property of the State,
Section 4 applies specifically to the assessment of metalliferous
mines and mining claims and authorizes their assessment "as
the Legislature shall provide." Therefore, the fact that the
Legislature has provided for the assessment of such mines and
mining claims by an entirely different formula than that applied
to other property, does not violate the provisions of Sections
2 and 3. Such was the holding of the Supreme Court of the
United States in the case of South Utah Mines & Smelters
vs. Beaver County, 262 U. S. 325, 67 L. ed. 1004:
"The state constitution plainly contemplates that
all property, irrespective of its character, shall be taxed
'according to its value in money.' The provisions with
reference to the taxation of metalliferous mines does not
mean to depart from this rule, but recognizes that their
value cannot be determined in the ordinary way, since
the ores which constitute the wealth of such property
are hidden in the earth, and, as a general thing, disclosure of their extent and character must await extraction.
The Constitution, therefore, provides, not for disregarding value in the assessment of taxes upon mines, but for
arriving at it in a special manner- that is, by a measurement proportioned to the net annual proceeds derived
from the property. The 11alue of property bears a relation
to the income which it affords . . . The constitutional
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provision, therefore, at best, will produce only approximate equality. Undoubtedly in fixing the multiple of
the net annual proceeds upon which the value of metalliferous mines is to be calculated a good deal of latitude
must be allowed the Legislature and the taxing authorities, but the power is not unbounded."
This same principal was enunciated by the Montana Supreme Court in the case of Byrne v. Fulton Oil Company, 85
Mont. 329,278 P. 514, as follows:
"The net proceeds tax is simply a tax in lieu of, or as a
substitute for, the ad valorum tax on the value of mines
or mining interests." (Citing Salt Lake County vs. Utah
Copper Company, 294 Fed. 199.)
Not only have "proceeds" been the formula for determining mining value for taxation purposes in connection with
metalliferous mines and mining claims, it has also been applied
for determining values for public utilities such as railroads,
motor carriers, and other activities. In each instance it is not
whether the different companies or individuals within the
class have the same income or "proceeds" but whether the rule
applies uniformly to all such individuals or companies within
such class.
At a glance, it is clear that our Statutes relating to
assessment of metalliferous mines and mining claims, apply
alike to Respondents and other mining cmpanies. The same
formula is applied to each company in the same mannerthat is, as stated by the Supreme Court in South Utah .Mines
& Smelters v. Beaver County, supra, "\'Vhat arc the net annual
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proceeds derived from the property?" In each instance all
income received from mining operations-that is, production
of ores-is calculated to determine "gross proceeds" from
which are deducted costs of production as defined in the
statute to determine what the "net proceeds" of the mine
are for taxation purposes. The fact that Mine "A" may
receive more "gross proceeds" because of a more favorable
quota assigned to it does not result in discrimination or lack
of uniformity any more than the fact that Mine "A" may
have received more for its ores prior to the War by reason of
a fluctuating market. Again, we wish to call attention to the
holding of this Court in the case of Mercur Gold Mining &
Milling Company vs. Spry, 16 Utah 222, 52 Pac. 382, as
follows:
"By the term 'net annual proceeds of the mine' is meant
what is annually realized from the product of the mine,
over and above all the costs and expenses of obtaining
such proceeds and converting the same into money."

This rule has repeatedly been affirmed, not only by this
court, but by the Federal courts. See Salt Lake County vs. Utah
Copper Company, 294 Fed. 199. In the case of Tintic Standard
Mining Company v. Utah County, 80 Utah 491, 15 P. (2d)
633, this Court, in answering the contention that the rule for
determining "net proceeds" had been so changed by subsequent legislations as to render the formula discriminatory and
void, held:
"There is no express limitation to prevent the Legislature from making the Constitution effective by providing
the method by which the assessment may be made as
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applied to the basis specified in the Constitution. When
the 1918 constitutional amendment was adopted, the
words 'net annual proceeds' had attained a definite and
well-understood meaning, as including 'what is annually
realized from the product of the mine, over and above
all costs and expenses of obtaining such proceeds and
converting same into money.' This meaning had been
impressed on the words by the legislative enactment of
1896, by judicial construction in 1898 in the case of
Mercur Gold Mining & Milling Company v. Spry, supra,
and by actual use and application by the taxing officials
of the state during a period of twenty-two years . . . A
careful comparison of the statute of 1919 with the
statute in force at the time of the adoption of the 1918
amendment to the Constitution will show that, properly
construed, its provisions are in harmony with the former
statute and also in harmony with the definition of the
term expressed in the decision of this court in Mercur
Gold Mining and Milling Co. v. Spry, supra."
Basically, we still have the same formula for the assessment
of mines as was applied in the Spry case. This rule applies
uniformly to all mines and mining claims. But it does not
necessarily follow that every mine will have the same valuation
by the application of this formula. In order to have the same
valuation as Mine "B," each factor going to make up Mine
"A"s net proceeds will have to be identical with the factors
going to make up Mine "B"s net proceeds. We readily concede
that the fact that the single factor of "Quota" assigned to a
particular mine may result in one mine receiving more "gross
proceeds" for a ton of ore than is received by another mine
which may have a higher quota. But this does not necessarily
result in a higher valuation for the first mine or for the mine
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with the greater total "gross proceeds." According to the
theory on which quotas were established, a mine with a
lower quota (and therefore receiving greater "gross proceeds") should have higher costs of production which would
result in less "net proceeds" on which the assessment of the
mining property is based.
On the other hand, a difference in Quota is not the only
factor which may result in a difference in "gross proceeds"
with respect to two mines similarly situated. It is a well
recognized fact that the mining companies have different
contracts with the smelters as to the percentage of recovery
from the ores shipped by the different mines. Mine "A" and
Mine "B" may be mining ore of the same quality and character,
but Mine "A" may receive more for its ore shipped to the
smelter because it has a more favorable contract than Mine
"B." In other words, a carload of ore shipped from Mine "A"
might bring a greater "price" from the smelter than the same
carload of ore shipped from Mine "B," merely beq.use of the
difference in the contract which the two mines might have with
the smelter. But this certainly does not render the formula
for determining "gross proceeds" or "net proceeds" discriminatory, nor does it result in lack of uniformity of assessment. It
does result, however, in assessing Mine "A" at a greater value
than Mine "B," if the former has a greater net return from its
mine production.
It might be well to pause here to discuss some of the
cases in which a similar question has arisen as to unif~rmity
of assessment. In the case of Salomen v. State Tax Commis-
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sion of New York, 278 U. S. 484, 49 Sup. Ct. 192, the Supreme
Court of the United States had before it the question of the
validity of a New York tax against future interests in property.
The contention was there made that such a tax was discriminatory as between individuals of the same class, and that a
different method of assessment might have been made which
would apply more uniformly. In rejecting both of these contentions the Court held:
"The fact that a better taxing system might be conceived does not render the law invalid . . . To all such
objections it may be answered that minor inequalities
and hardships are incidents of every system of taxation
and do not render the legislation obnoxious to the Federal Constitution. General American Tank Car Corp. v.
Day, 270 U.S. 367, 46 Sup. Ct. 234, 70 L. Ed. 635."
Again, in the case of Alward v. Johnson, ________ U_S. ________ ,
51 Sup Ct. 273, 75 A.L.R. 9, the constitutionality of a "gross
receipts" tax levied by the State of California on all companies
"owning, operating or managing automobile, truck," and other
carrier lines. In the case in question the property replacement
value of the taxpayer was considerably less than the receipts
derived from its operation. This arose from the fact that
protestant had a contract with the Federal Government for the
carrying of mails. From receipts other than such contracts,
there was insufficient to pay the operating costs of the carrier
operations. The argument was made that plaintiff's ability
to earn more with the contract than other persons could with
the same property but without the contract, could not be
considered in arriving at a value of his property, and that a
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formula for arriving at "gross receipts" which took into consideration receipts from such contract rendered the assessment
against the plaintiff "confiscatory, arbitrary, excessive," and
"does not take into consideration the actual value of the
property involved, and was without consideration of any
element of value except the gross earnings." This contention
was rejected by the Supreme Court, and the statute upheld.
Too, the inclusion of the receipts derived from the Federal
contract was sustained.
In Minnesota the assessment of railroads is based on their
gross earnings. In the case of State v. Great Northern Ry. Co.,
174 Minn. 3, 218 N. W. 167, the validity of the statute was
attacked because it appeared that certain railroads received
huge receipts from the transporation of iron ores from the
mines to the lakes where such ores were shipped to the smelters.
It was argued that by the application of the formula set forth
in the statute, one railroad might be valued at a much higher
figure than another although the cost of building and replacing the roadbed of each would be the same--that insofar
as intrinsic value was concerned each might have the same
value, but because one railroad obtained large revenues from
its ore contracts it would be assessed at a much higher figure.
In repudiating the argument of the railroad, the Supreme Court
of .Minnesota held:
'"The taxing authorities must take gross earnings as
they find them. They do not fix earnings . . . Large
earnings give value, and the road has a unitary value
which cannot be disregarded because one mile costs for
construction more than others . . . The property of the
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railroad is taxable at its value as a going concern. The
ore traffic originates in Minnesota. The rate is not unduly competitive. The railroad which has the privilege
of carrying the ore, whether through direct ownership
or indirect ownership or control makes the earnings. No
other could. Without such ownership or control or contracts ore-carrying roads would not have their present
value nor make their present great earnings. We cannot see that the statutory scheme of taxation is unconstitutional or that the tax which it imposes works a
hardship upon the defendant through an excessive
valuation. Such earnings give the defendant's property
great value which reflects itself in taxes."
Likewise, in the present cases, we might state that "net
proceeds" or receipts of a mine give it a certain value which
a mine receiving less "net proceeds" does not enjoy, even
though such net earnings might be a result of a more favorable
smelter contract, lesser costs of production, or a more favorable
quota from the federal government on which premium payments are received.
Another Minnesota case, Fraser v. Vermillion Mining
Company, 175 Minn. 305, 221 S.W. 167 (appeal dismissed,
56 Sup. Ct. 750), dealt with the proceeds derived from royalties received by mine owners. The statute imposed a mining
royalty tax which was attacked on the grounds that it would
result in inequality of taxation because one mine operator
might receive greater royalites than another. In upholding the
tax, the Court held:
"Since the tax is measured by the amounts of the
stipulated yearly consideration paid for the permission
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to mine, it is true that equality may not always result.
Some leases run as low as 121;2 cents per ton mined, and
others as high as $1.25 per ton. No doubt the uncertainty of the mining value of the ore and of the varying
estimates of the mining cost at the time the lease is made
determine the royalty or consideration. Other factors
enter, such as the probable future market of the ore, as
well as its market value at the time of the lease. But
similar variations affect all sorts of property and the
taxation thereof. We may take as an example the operation of the gross earning tax, the validity of which is
so well-established that no authorities need be cited.
It is a tax imposed on the property of the owner in the
form of a lieu tax (citing cases). It is common knowledge that the tax paid by one of the railroads carrying
the iron ore from the mines in this state when compared
with the value of its property is many times greater than
the tax paid by the ordinary railroad when compared to
the value of the latter's property . . . .
Mining leases usually provide for a mtmmum
royalty to be paid whether mining is done or not, and
some contain provisions, not in others, that the minimum royalty thus paid shall be credited upon ore subsequently removed. The form of the permission under
which iron ore is being removed should not have such
bearing upon the validity of the law laying a tax upon
the interest of the one who grants the permission. The
law as construed in the Marble and the Lord Cases ( 172
Minn. 263, 215 N. W. 71, and 271 U.S. 577, 46 Sup Ct.
627, 70 L. Ed. 1093) affords, in our opinion, no valid
ground for claiming it to be an arbitrary and discriminatory classification of property for taxation purposes."
Other factors, than those above discussed as being involved in the determination of "gross proceeds" may affect
the determination of "net proceeds." One of such factors is
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the cost of producing the ore (which must be deducted before
arriving at the "net proceeds" of a mine). In the case of
Anaconda Copper Mining Company v. Juned, 71 Mont. 132,
227 Pac. 1001, the Board of Equalization refused to allow a
deduction for taxes and fire insurance premiums in arriving
at "net proceeds" of a metalliferous mine for assessment purposes. (There the statute provided that only "actual costs"
of production of the ore could be deducted.) The mining
company took the same position that Respondents take in
the instant cases, arguing that such a construction of the
statute would render it unconstitutional for lack of uniformity
of assessment. The Montana Supreme Court discusses the problem as follows:
"Finally it is urged that, if defendant's contention
is upheld and taxes and insurance are not deductible
items, then the same is in conflict with section 1 of article 12 of the state Constitution, which provides, inter
alia, that the Legislature shall levy a uniform rate of
assessment and taxation and prescribe such regulations
as shall secure a just valuation of all property. It is contended that a company owning a mine and not a reduction works may be compelled to pay, in the rate charged
for reduction, a certain portion of overhead charges in
excess of the actual cost of reduction, and that the net
proceeds of mines in this instance would be different
than if a company owned a mine and also a reduction
works. This argument also would be true in the case of
two separate companies owning mines and each owning
a reduction works. The actual cost of reduction may in
one instance be greater than the other, through management of the business and therefore the net proceeds of
the mines in each case would be different. In either case,
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the cost of reduction would be the money actually expended for extracting the metals and minerals from
the ores. So, in the case of a company owning a mine
and not a reduction works, the custom rate paid by it
for extracting metals and minerals from ores would be
actual cost to it. It has no control over the price charged.
It must be paid. It is an actual cost to it, even though it
is not an actual cost to the owner of the reduction works
. . . Therefore we are of the opinion that our construction does not conflict with this constitutional provision.
This provision does not demand that absolute uniformity exist . . .
We are therefore constrained to answer the question involved herein in the negative and thereby hold
that taxes and insurance are not deductible items in de·
termining the net proceeds of mines."
\'Vhat the Montana Court stated in the quotation just
completed should resolve any doubt this Court might have
as to the constitutionality of such a construction of our statutes
as would include "premium payments" in the "gross proceeds"
received from the product of Respondents' mines. The formula
set forth by the statutes is relatively simple and will result in
most cases in an accurate valuation of mining property. However, it appears obvious that a company which is extravagant
in its cc:,'s of production may have a lesser valuation for
t;:;.xation purposes than another mine which has less "gross
proceeds," but because of efficient mining operations is able
to keep its costs of production down. Likewise, a mining company which owns its own smelter or reduction works, might,
as was stated in the Anaconda Copper Mining Company case,
supra, have less costs of reduction and extraction than a similar
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mining company which might even ship its ores to the first
mining company for reduction or smelting and pay a higher
amount for such services. In each instance the "actual cost" of
such operation to the mining company is deductible in arriving
at "net proceeds."
Other factors than difference in quotas, which might result in a different assessment with respect to mines otherwise
similarly situated are:
1. Difference in smelter contracts whereby one mmmg

company receives more favorable returns on its ores shipped
for reduction or extraction. This has been discussed hereinbefore.
2. Difference

market price at the present time or at
any time when ceiling prices were not fixed by 0. P. A. One
mining company may hold its ores at the mine and refuse to
ship until it receives a more favorable market price. This is
particularly true in the case of Kennecott Copper Corporation
as to copper mined at its Utah Copper mine. Because of its
resources, Kennecott has been able to retain its ore for more
favorable markets in times past, and has been able to cut down
its other costs by large operations, efficient marketing methods,
etc.
111

3. Difference in labor costs. It is a well known fact that
prior to organizing of laborers working for the Kennecott
Copper Corporation, lower wages were paid by that company
than were paid to union employees by other companies en-
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gaged in the same activities. Too, labor costs may be minimized by distance over which the ore must travel to reach the
mine portal. Many other incidental factors here might cause
a different assessment of mines having equal production of
ores for which the same "gross proceeds" may be received.
4. Maintenance costs at the mine, including extending
its workings, etc. The rule for deduction of such costs is set
forth specifically in Seciton 80-5-57, defining "net annual proceeds." In construing such section this Court, in the case of
Tintic Standard Mining Company v. Utah County, supra,
refused to allow the mining company a deduction for the
cost of acquiring certain tunnels and workings purchased from
the Iron Blossom Mine, even though it appeared that such
mine had not taken any deduction for such costs in the past.
This Court, however, recognized that if the Tintic Standard
Mining Company had developed the tunnels and workings
in connection with its operations in mining ores, such costs
would have been deductible under subdivisions 1 and 3 of
Section 80-5-5 7, supra. But having purchased such workings
as a part of a mine, they were a capital item and not a part of
the expense of mining ore.
5. Cost of transportation of the ore from the mine to the
market or reduction works. Again a mnie such as the Utah
Copper mine of the Kennecott Copper Corporation, is at a
distinct advantage because a wholly owned subsidiary transports the ore from the mine to the reduction works and smelter.
It very well might be that such costs are considerably below
those to other mining companies in the same vicinity that ship
by other means to the smelter or reduction works.
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6. Cost of reduction, sampling, assaymg, and smelting
and extracting the metals and minerals from the ores. This
factor has been discussed hereinabove and the language of
the Montana court in the Anaconda Copper Mining Company
case, supra, reveals that while such a factor might well result
in a different assessment for two mines otherwise similarly
situated, such does not render the statute unconstitutional for
lack of uniformity.
7. Expenses of operation which are not deductible in any
event under the provisions of Section 80-5-58, Utah Code
Annotated 1943. Such expenses include legal expense, salaries
paid to corporate officers, as such, or the owner or owners of
any unincorporated mining property. This matter was resolved
in the case of Tintic Standard Mining Company v. Utah
County, supra, where it was determined what constituted
salaries to corporate officers. It may very well be that one
company will pay much of its income from mining to its corporate officers in order to avoid the consequences of higher
franchise or income taxes. nut even though its books will
show a small net income for such taxation purposes, its "net
proceeds" are calculated without allO\ving such deductions.
It is thus very obvious that the factor with which this
Court was concerned in requesting a further brief on the question of uniformity of taxation by the inclusion of "premium
payments" in the "gross proceeds," is only one of many factors
which may result in one mining company being required to pay
greater taxes because it has a greater "net proceeds" valuation.
In each instance, the formula is applied the same, but because
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of difference in marketing costs, amounts received for the ores,
or in the various operating costs, one mine may end up with a
greater or lesser "net proceeds" dependent on the application
of the foregoing factors. How can it be argued that one factor
is more important than another, or that one factor may result
in discriminatory assessment while another factor will not?
On the other hand, as was hereinbefore suggested, it
might very well be argued that to fail to include "premium
payments" in arriving at the "gross proceeds" of a mine would
actually result in discrimination. A glance at the several charts
contained in the Statement before the Tax Commission will
reveal that very few of the mining companies of this state
would show any "net proceeds" from the products of their
mines without the inclusion of "premium payments." Would
it be fair to a mining company that received little or no premium
payments and yet, because of efficient methods of operation,
together with low production costs, was able to show a profit
from its operations to be required to p'ay a tax based on twice
such net annual proceeds while another mining company was
able to obtain a zero quota on its ore production and by a
large scale operation and heavy costs of production receive considerable premium payments, resulting in a sizeable net income
to its stockholders, but because it took a deduction of all such
increased costs of production from the amounts received from
the smelters, without including "premium payments" was able
to show a loss or no net proceeds and thereby escape taxation.
Cert:1inly the latter mine should be required to count all of
its receipts along with taking all of its deductions, in order to

24
make the application of the formula uniform to all mmmg
compames.
Not only does the inclusion of such "premium payments"
10 the "gross proceeds" result in uniformity of assessment
under our Statutes, but such payments were considered by the
Federal Agencies as being a part of the "price structure" in
connection with the sale and disposition of the ores mined.
For this reason it was necessary for an amendment to the
0. P. A. regulations to be adopted (Amendment No. 4, referred to heretofore in Appellants' briefs filed in both cases)
authorizing mining companies to receive "premium payments"
under the "Premium Payment Plan," without being in violation of the regulation governing ceiling prices on ores. To the
same effect was the regulation permitting the inclusion of
amounts received under "A" quotas as a part of the price
received for such ores in determining the royalties to be paid
under leasing contracts. And it must be remembered that in
connection with the cases now before the court we are concerned only with "A" quotas and not with "B" and "C" quotas.
However, a similar result would be obtained as to such quotas
and the premiums paid pursuant thereto, since all of such
payments were made for the purpose of compensating the
mine for work done in connection with its mininz operations,
and were therefore offset by the deductions taken for such
costs of operation.
CONCLUSION
From what has been said herein, we feel that the question
submitted by the Court can be resolved only in favor of Appel-
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lants to the effect that the inclusion of "premium payments"
in the "gross proceeds" derived from the products of Respondents' mines will not violate the provisions of Sections 2, 3,
and 4 of Article XIII of our State Constitution. On the other
hand, such inclusion will result in greater uniformity of assessment and result in including all receipts, whereas Respondents
would have only part of the amount received calculated as
"gross receipts" or "gross proceeds."
In conclusion we wish to thank the Court for the opportunity afforded to furnish additional briefs on the question
involved. We stand ready and willing to offer any such assistance as may be possible in aid of the Court in determining
the problem before it.
Respectfully submitted,
Grover A. Giles, Attorney General of Utah
Zar E. Hayes, Assistant Attorney General
Arthur H. Nielsen, Special Assistant Att'y .Gen.
Phares Johnson, Tooele County Attorney
Attorneys for Appellants.

